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1 Introduction
In this note I describe the use of transposition of binary matrices to create
maximal diffusion and confusion in a block cipher.
2 Background
The idea of basing a polygraphic cipher on matrix transposition goes back
to an unpublished idea of the author and is in turn an extension of the old
idea of fractionating ciphers, [1], to the case of binary representations. To
set the scene we first describe how the binary matrix transposition notion
can be used to create simple polygraphic ciphers. We will then go on in the
next section to adapt the idea for use in a machine, block cipher.
2.1 The Code d’Azur
The basic form of the cipher acts on blocks of characters of length n. For
illustration we describe a version of the cipher using blocks of five characters.
First we segment the plaintext into blocks of length five.
Suppose that we have an alphabet A of size 32, i.e., the Roman alphabet
plus some additional characters. Denote the space of mappings from A into
the 5 bit strings by Ψ and define a bijective map from a key space K into Ψ:
ψ(k) : K → Ψ
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Similarly, we define a mapping from K into the space of mappings from
5 bit strings to A:
ϕ(k) : K → (B5 → A)
A simple pentagraphic cipher can be constructed from this by taking
blocks of five characters in A, translating each character into a 5 bit string
via ψ(k1). Each of these strings is written into a row of a 5 × 5 matrix ac-
cording to a schedule dictated by a keyed permutation pi(k2). The ciphertext
characters are read off the columns of the matrix according to a schedule
given by pi(k3) a and translated into plaintext characters using ϕ(k4).
We see that this gives us a pentagraphic cipher that maps blocks of
five plaintext characters into blocks of five ciphertext characters. Changing
any character of the input plaintext group will result in a 50/50 probability
of changing any one of the output ciphertext characters, thus providing
maximal diffusion within blocks.
The idea can be generalised and extended in various ways: we could use
longer strings, hence larger matrices and larger encryption blocks. Matrices
do not need to be square.
3 Block ciphers based on binary matrix transpo-
sition
We now investigate how the idea of matrix transposition can be adapted
to form the basis for a class of block ciphers, that we refer to as Phoenix
ciphers. We will describe a version with block size 256, though variants
with say 128 are also quite feasible. Encryption will involve n rounds. We
will assume a suitable key scheduling algorithm that will generate a 256-bit
round key for each round. We also assume a suitable S-box style mapping
B8 → B8. The F8 inversion S-boxes used in AES would be suitable as they
are known to be provide resistance to linear and differential attacks.
3.1 Some Notation
Intermediate states are best thought of as structured into four segments of
64 bits each. Each segment is then partitioned into eight 8 bit strings. Let:
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1. si,j,k denote the ith string of the jth segment of the state in the kth
round. si,j,0 thus denotes the input plaintext strings.
2. ki,j,k denote ith string of the jth segment of the key in the kth round.
3. Mj,k denote the jth matrix of the kth round.
4. Mi,j,k denote the ith row of the jth matrix of the kth round.
5. M ,ij,k denote the ith column of the jth matrix of the kth round.
6. f(s) denote the output of the s-box given input s.
3.2 The Rounds
The state of each round will be represented as four 8 by 8 matrices.
The first round of encryption proceeds as follows:
Each plaintext input strings is ⊕ed with the first round key strings and
put through the s-box transformation:
si,j,1 := f(si,j,0 ⊕ ki,j,1)
The resulting strings are written into the rows of the first round matrices:
Mi,j,1 := si,j,1
These four 8 by 8 matrices now constitute the state of the first round.
The state of the second round is formed from the these four matrices
as follows: we read down the columns of the matrices to give 8 bit sub-
strings. Each of these 8-bit strings is ⊕ed with the appropriate key string
and then fed through the S-box. The resulting transformed 8-bit strings are
now written into the rows of the round two matrices according to a pattern
designed to maximise diffusion and ensure the Strict Avalanche Criterion.
More precisely, from the first matrix we read of the first two columns,
we ⊕ these with appropriate substrings of the second round key and the
resulting strings are put through the s-box transform. The resulting pair
of 8 bit strings are written into the first two rows of the first matrix of the
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second round. The order of the rows may be governed by a further keyed
permutation, but we will not discuss this possibility in this note.
The next two columns of the first round one matrix are similarly ⊕ed
with key strings, s-box transformed and written into first two rows of the
second, second round matrix and so on until all the columns of the first
matrix have been written into the first two rows of all four of the second
round matrices. Notice that each of the second round matrices has its first
two rows derived from pairs of columns drawn from the first, round one
matrix.
The columns of the second, round one matrix are similarly treated and
written into the third and fourth of rows of the second round matrices, and
so on for the third and fourth, round one matrices. The upshot of all this is
that each second round matrix will have two rows derived from two columns
of each of the first round matrices. This is to guarantee that the Strict
Avalanche Criterion, [2], is achieved: for every output bit bi of the final
ciphertext, flipping any input bit will have a 1/2 probability of flipping bi.
More formally, the initial state is constructed as:
Mi,j,1 := f(si,j,0 ⊕ ki,j,1)
The state matrices of the k+ 1th round computed from the state of the
kth round as follows:
Mi,j,k+1 := f(M ,p+2jl,k ⊕ ki,j,k)
where i = 2l + p− 2.
The final ciphertext string of 256 bits is derived from the state of the
nth round by simply reading off the columns of the state marices in order,
⊕ing them with the strings of the final key string and S-box transforming
them.
ci,j := f(M ,ij,n ⊕ ki,j,n)
4 The Strict Avalanche Criterion
Proof: the s-boxes ensure that flipping an input bit in any 8 bit sub-string
results in a 1/2 probability of flipping each of corresponding 8 bits of output.
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Thus the bits of the corresponding row in the matrix each have a 1/2 prob-
ability of being flipped. Thus for each of the column of this matrix there is
a 1/2 probability that the input to the s-box has been altered and so a 1/4
probability of each of the output bits from the s-box being flipped. Thus,
by feeding the output of two such columns into rows of each of the matrices
of the next stage, we ensure that the probability that each of the resulting
columns of each matrix has a 1/2 probability of being altered.
5 Decryption
Decryption is achieved by simply running the above algorithm in reverse.
6 128 Block Version
The above scheme can easily be adapted to a 128 bit version. To do this
we simply use two 8 by 8 matrices and, instead of deriving two rows of each
k+1the round matrix from two columns of each of the kth round matrices,
we now derive four columns.
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